Obama supports racial preferences … again

Roger CleggUncategorized

Earlier this month, the Obama administration filed a brief with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit urging it to rule in favor of the University of Texas’s use of racial and ethnic preferences in admissions. This is the Fisher v. University of Texas case that the Supreme Court decided last summer and sent back to the Fifth Circuit, telling it that it had been too deferential — not strict enough — in the scrutiny it had given the school’s use of preferences. It’s the administration’s third brief on behalf of the school’s practice of discrimination, following earlier filings in the Supreme Court and, before that, in the Fifth Circuit, when the case was first on its way up.

The administration’s brief is predictably bad. Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling, it tries to smuggle plenty of deference into the University’s decision to discriminate in order to achieve greater and greater “diversity” (that is, more blacks and Latinos, and fewer whites and Asians). It supports the school in its desire to manipulate its ethnic numbers, not just campuswide, but on a classroom-by-classroom basis. It also supports the school in wanting to achieve higher numbers for Latinos because, well, there are more Latinos in Texas than there used to be (what Justice Powell in Bakke called “discrimination for its own sake”). And it endorses dubious social-science evidence to support these race-based outcomes, like “student surveys to determine . . . the degree to which minority students feel isolated.”

In addition, the brief assumes that racial diversity is the only way to achieve the purported “educational benefits” of student body diversity.  But diversity of background, experiences, and viewpoints among students can be achieved without using skin color and national origin as a proxy for background, experience, and viewpoint — that is, without stereotyping.

Finally, there is nothing, not one word, in the brief urging the court that, in addition to these dubious benefits, perhaps some consideration should be given to the costs of racial discrimination by the University of Texas: It is personally unfair, passes over better-qualified students, and sets a disturbing legal, political, and moral precedent in allowing racial discrimination; it creates resentment; it stigmatizes the so-called beneficiaries in the eyes of their classmates, teachers, and themselves, as well as future employers, clients, and patients; it mismatches African Americans and Latinos with the school, setting them up for failure; it fosters a victim mindset, removes the incentive for academic excellence, and encourages separatism; it compromises the academic mission of the university and lowers the overall academic quality of the student body; it creates pressure to discriminate in grading and graduation; it breeds hypocrisy within the school and encourages a scofflaw attitude among college officials; it papers over the real social problems underlying why so many African Americans and Latinos are academically uncompetitive; and it gets this state university involved in unsavory activities like deciding which racial and ethnic minorities will be favored and which ones not, and how much blood is needed to establish group membership — an untenable legal regime as America becomes an increasingly multiracial, multiethnic society and as individual Americans are themselves more and more likely to be multiracial and multiethnic (starting with our president).

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Just in time for the Fisher remand, there’s yet more evidence supporting a ban on racial preferences in university admissions.  I’m not sure whether the authors of this new study intended that support or not, but it does indeed bolster two of the main points made by critics of racial preferences: First, that they have a significant impact on who gets admitted; and, second, that universities will not stop using them unless they are required to do so in no uncertain terms by a law or a court ruling. Thus, the amicus brief we filed with the Supreme Court recently in Fisher v. University of Texas cited earlier studies by the Center for Equal Opportunity to show that the amount of weight given to race had not been diminished by the Grutter and Gratz decisions in 2003 — that, in fact, there was evidence of more discrimination now than ever at many schools, and that the amount of discrimination was dramatic.

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The Center for Equal Opportunity also liked the recent statement by Justice Samuel Alito, questioning the “highly unusual practice” followed by federal district judge Harold Baer, Jr. (of the Southern District of New York), in assessing the adequacy of counsel in class actions.  Judge Baer appears to be at pains to ensure, in his own words, that the lawyers for class-action plaintiffs “fairly reflect the class composition in terms of relevant race and gender metrics.”  That is, the melanin content of the lawyers has to reflect the melanin content of the plaintiffs.   I had noted Judge Baer’s dubious track record in this area a few years ago, and soon thereafter the Center for Equal Opportunity filed a complaint against him, the substance of which read as follows (citations omitted):

It is generally unconstitutional for government actors to engage in discrimination or even use classifications based on race, ethnicity, or sex.  Indeed, such classifications and discrimination are “presumptively invalid.”  In addition, law firms are employers covered by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act [prohibiting employment discrimination on, inter alia, the basis of race, ethnicity, or sex], so Judge Baer’s order is also inconsistent with that statute.  Canon 2 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges provides, “A judge should not hold membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin; a fortiori, then, it would seem inappropriate for the judge himself or herself to engage in such discrimination.  Finally, for a judge to instruct law firms in the assignment of counsel in this manner raises Sixth Amendment (right to counsel) issues as well.

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Happy Thanksgiving!